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 Drawing on a cost
benefit perspective, this paper explores the relation between 
information asymmetry and the decision to delist from stock exchanges during periods of uncertainty. 
Specifically, it investigates the role of firms’ intangible investments and the availability of alternative 
sources of finance on the decision to delist from foreign stock markets.

!	"	"
 
The study takes advantage of a natural experiment in which cross

listed Chinese firms facing uncertainty in US markets due to widespread allegations of accounting 
fraud, decide on whether to remain listed or voluntarily delist. The decision to delist is modeled as a 
function of the level of information asymmetry between firms and their stakeholders, and the 
availability of alternative financing, while controlling for other drivers of firms’ delisting decision. 
The data used in the empirical analyses covers a hand
collected sample of 91 Chinese firms 
voluntarily delisting from US stock markets between 2010 and 2016. This sample is matched with an 
equal sample of Chinese firms, which remained listed in US stock markets during the same period. A 
probit regression model accounting for fixed
effects is used.  
#
 
There is a significant positive relationship between investments in intangible assets and 
firms’ decision to delist. Moreover, the positive intangibles
delisting nexus is accentuated by the 
availability of alternative sources of financing. Collectively, the results are consistent with the 
                                                     
*The authors acknowledge constructive feedback from three anonymous reviewers and the excellent and 
expeditious editorial service of the Editor
in
Chief, Professor Maggie Liu. All errors and omissions remain the 
responsibility of the authors. 
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theoretical argument that the higher information asymmetry associated with intangible assets may 
increase the cost of staying listed on stock exchanges, particularly, in periods of uncertainty (captured 
in this study by accounting fraud allegations targeting cross
listed firms). The results have important 
implications for corporate managers, capital market participants, and policy makers.

$"%	
 
The study exploits a unique natural experimental setting to explore why cross

listed firms delist. The underlying theoretical framework to explain delisting is new. This framework 
captures the role of information asymmetry, uncertainty and alternative financing in explaining the 
cost and benefits of remaining listed on a foreign market.

&	' Voluntary delisting; Intangible assets; Information asymmetry; US stock exchange; China. 
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The liberalisation of capital markets, as well as, technological progress in recent years has created 
new opportunities for firms to seek development and growth beyond their national borders. Prior 
studies (see e.g., Merton, 1987; Stulz, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000; Karolyi, 2006; Bharath and 
Dittmar, 2010; Eng and Ling, 2012) have explored the motivations of foreign firms listing in US stock 
markets. The extant research suggests that foreign firms cross
list into the US market to gain access to 
lower cost of capital (Errunza and Miller, 2000; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010), greater investor 
recognition (Merton, 1987), or as a commitment mechanism to the stricter US regulations and 
investor protection rights (Stulz, 1999; Karolyi, 2006; Eng and Ling, 2012). Clearly, besides stricter 
regulations, there are other costs associated with listing on more sophisticated markets, most notably, 
greater information disclosure requirements (Eng and Ling, 2012) and increased scrutiny by 
stakeholders such as analysts and the press. It is unclear, in existing research, how these associated 
cost influences delisting decisions, and the case of cross
listed Chinese firms in US markets provides 
a natural setting to explore this issue. 
The China Securities Regulatory Commission, established in 1992, allowed Chinese firms to 
cross
list. This led to a surge in the number of Chinese firms listing in foreign markets, particularly in 
the US. As in Figure 1, the number of Chinese firms listing on US markets increased successively 
each year from 2001, reaching its peak in 2007. Noticeably, Chinese firms’ listings on US markets 
significantly reduced to 11 in 2011, representing a 96% decline from the previous year. Concurrently, 
as shown in Table 2, a wave of voluntary delisting also emerged.1 Recent figures suggest that between 
2010 and 2015, there were over 80 delisting announcements from US stock exchanges involving 
Chinese firms. This wave of delisting has been attributed to loss of investor confidence following 
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reports of fraudulent accounting practices in some Chinese US
listed firms (Song and Zeng, 2012).  
*+,-.
#/-,
(0

Notably, a survey report released by Muddy Waters Research Company in June 2010 suggested 
that some US
listed Chinese firms (e.g. Orient Paper) were involved in fraudulent financial reporting. 
Similarly, Citron Research reported accounting fraud and bribery scandals involving Evergrande Real 
Estate Group (a high profile Chinese firm). Even though these claims were unsubstantiated, 
Evergrande Real Estate Group lost HK$8 billion of its market value. Arguably, the scrutiny, 
allegations, exposure and suspicion relating to accounting fraud instigated a mass exodus of Chinese 
firms from US stock markets (see Song and Zeng, 2012; Liu 
  2016; Zhang, 2012). Interestingly, 
some Chinese firms maintained their US listing. 
The case of Chinese firms delisting from US exchanges between 2010 and 2016 creates a natural 
experimental setting to explore the decisions of cross
listed firms under uncertainty. This article, 
therefore, examines whether firms with a higher perceived cost of cross
listing embark on delisting 
for precautionary reasons. Here, the paper utilises firm
level intangible investments (which capture 
the level of information asymmetry between firms and stakeholders) to proxy for the level of scrutiny 
that firms potentially face when investors suspect accounting fraud. Drawing from the cost
benefit 
perspective on why firms become public (see, Maupin 
 ., 1984; Kaplan, 1991; Bharath and 
Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012), the paper argues that when investors (notably US

based) associate cross
listed (Chinese) firms with accounting fraud, the cost of remaining listed 
becomes asymmetrically higher for those firms with high information asymmetry (proxied by 
intangibles).2 Consequently, it is posited that the presence of intangible assets increases (reduces) the 
costs (net benefits) of being listed on overseas’ markets, resulting in a higher propensity to delist in 
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times of uncertainty (i.e., when cross
listed firms are susceptible to accounting fraud allegations). To 
corroborate this benefit
cost argument, the paper considers how the delisting decision is shaped by a 
firm’s propensity to secure alternative private funding.  
The present article contributes to the scant but growing literature on public
to
private 
transactions (PTPs) by providing evidence that possibly explains why cross
listed firms faced with 
uncertainty respond differently, i.e., some remain listed while others delist. Thus, the study documents 
the fundamental drivers (beyond the investor confidence crisis) of firms’ voluntary delisting decisions. 
Moreover, it contributes to this PTPs literature which has largely focused on transactions of firms in 
the advanced economies of the US and the UK, often using dated data (see, e.g. Renneboog 
  
2007; Marosi and Massoud, 2007;
 Pour and Laser, 2013), with empirical studies on firms from 
emerging economies like China being rare.3  
This paper relates to, but also differs from recent research by Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) 
and Pour and Laser (2013). Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012) examine the factors motivating 
foreign firms to delisting from US stock exchanges over the period 1962
2006, while the current 
article specifically considers the delisting decisions of Chinese firms from US markets for a more 
recent period (2010
2016) when there was a foreign investor confidence crisis. Similarly, Pour and 
Laser (2013) analyse the motives and market valuations of voluntary delisting from the London Stock 
Exchange during 1995
2009. They mainly focus on firms’ capital structure rebalancing as a driver of 
their delisting decisions, whereas the focus of the current study is on the role of intangible assets in 
driving the delisting decisions of Chinese firms from US stock exchanges. Focusing on intangible 
assets is important given the increasing prominence of intangible assets vis
à
vis investments in 
capital expenditure by firms (Anagnostopoulou, 2008; Borisova and Brown, 2013). For example, 
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Borisova and Brown (2013) report the ratio of R&D spending to total assets in 2008 to be around 10% 
compared to a capital expenditure ratio of about 4% for publicly listed companies with coverage in 
the '

 database.            

The results, based on a probit analysis of 91 voluntary delisting announcements by Chinese firms 
listed on US markets during 2010 to 2016, and a carefully selected control sample, show that 
investments in intangible assets are a significant driver of firms’ voluntary delisting decisions, after 
controlling for other determinants of the delisting decision. Specifically, the results show a delisting 
probability of 11% for an average sample firm undertaking average levels of intangible investments. 
The paper further finds the delisting probability to be even higher, ranging from 20
22%, for those 
firms with the topmost intangible investments (e.g. firms with above
median intangibles). Moreover, 
the evidence suggests that firms with higher intangible investments are more likely delist from stock 
markets when they have alternative sources of financing such as a prior successful equity issue or a 
thriving internal capital market.  
The results align with the article’s proposed theoretical framework, which contends that the 
higher information asymmetry and valuation challenges associated with intangibles 
(Anagnostopoulou, 2008) increase (decrease) the costs (net benefits) of remaining listed on stock 
exchanges, particularly when there is market uncertainty. The results are consistent with prior studies 
(e.g. Maupin 
 ., 1984; Kaplan, 1991; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 
2012) suggesting that firms tend to consider both costs and benefits in making their delisting 
decisions. Finally, the results have important implications for corporate managers, capital market 
participants, and policy makers.         
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One of the features of becoming a public firm in advanced economies is the intense media and 
analysts’ coverage/scrutiny (Eng and Ling, 2012). These analysts together with the press play an 
important role as an information intermediary in financial markets by often identifying corporate 
financial malfeasance and broadcasting them. Miller (2006) describes them as the “watchdog” of 
corporate America. Existing research on the relations between information intermediaries (e.g. the 
press, analysts, etc.) and ommerce suggests that these “watchdogs” do not only shape public 
perceptions of firms, but they also have a significant influence on financial market participants 
(Zingales, 2000; Jensen, 1979; Miller, 2000). Miller (2000) shows that that the press, through its 
exposure of accounting fraud, actually provides investors with valuable information, especially when 
their reports are backed by some investigations/research.  
Related literature suggests that analysts’ and press reports on accounting irregularities in public 
corporations adversely affect the fortunes of the public firm through loss of reputation (Karpoff 
  
2008), and ultimately, substantial decreases in stock prices (Feroz 
  1991; Dechow 
  1996; 
Miller, 2000). This suggests that besides the upfront cost of going public (e.g. admission fees), firms 
face additional risk/cost of intense scrutiny, particularly in relation to potential accounting fraud. 
Clearly, these additional costs may eventually outweigh the benefits of remaining listed (e.g., in 
periods of high uncertainty), motivating some listed firms to delist. 
 
( (*	
	
+
	
		
'	
High
profile allegations of accounting fraud involving Chinese firms in US stock markets in 2010 
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and 2012 increased levels of uncertainty and, perhaps, the fraud
related listing cost, for some firms. 
The first major allegation was published on 28th June 20104 by Muddy Waters Research LLC (Muddy 
Waters), a US privately
held investment firm that specialises in conducting investigative research and 
due diligence on public companies. Muddy Waters reported of egregious accounting fraud in Orient 
Paper Inc. (ONP)5, a Chinese company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and boldly concluded 
as follows: “,		


-%. /

	

	
	 ” The report cited specific accounting irregularities including ONP overstating its 
2008 and 2009 revenue by 27 and 40 times respectively, overvaluing its assets by at least 10 times, 
and misappropriating approximately US$30 million since October, 2009, among others. The report 
concluded with a “
	” recommendation. This incident did not just cause substantial damage to 
ONP, but it also heightened market fears that other Chinese public corporations may also be involved 
in similar fraudulent accounting practices (Zhang, 2012).  
Two years later (on 21st June 20126), Citron Research, a US
based analyst, made another high 
profile financial fraud allegation against Evergrande Real Estate Group Limited (Evergrande), a 
public Chinese firm. Citron Research claimed that: “…0	  	
 	 		

	 

	
	
	
 	
 	
	 

 	
	1”. The report 
detailed that Evergrande used bribery of local government officials and various “	
	
” to 
hide its insolvency, and that a total write
down of RMB 71 billion is required to move the company’s 
reported equity from RMB 35 billion to 	
 RMB 36 billion. Although the report was 
unsubstantiated, on the day of the allegation, the company’s share closed 11.4% down, compared to 
only a 1.3% decline on the market index. The allegation wiped
off over HK$8 billion from 
Evergrande’s market value, causing panic among some Chinese public companies and possibly 
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motivating them to exit US stock exchanges (Liu 
  2016). What followed these allegations was a 
reduction in the number of Chinese firms listing on US stock exchanges and a concurrent increase in 
the number of voluntary delisting.  
 
2) -		
		

		

2 ),
3
The extant literature advances several reasons to explain firms’ decision to delist. Firstly, from an 
agency perspective, managers with free
cash flows and low growth prospects might choose to waste 
cash on non
value
increasing projects (Jensen, 1986; Elmagrhi 
   2017). Delisting can curb 
agency conflicts by paying out excess cash or leveraging to repurchase stock (Lehn and Poulsen, 
1989; Kieschnick, 1998). Secondly, from a governance perspective, powerful CEOs might delist, 
possibly, to avoid the intense scrutiny and regulation associated with being a public firm (Weir 
  
2005a; Weir 
  2005b; Manuela and Giovanna, 2012).  
Thirdly, from an information asymmetry perspective, managers may choose to delist when they 
perceive their stock as being undervalued, limiting their ability to raise finance (e.g. Maupin 
  
1984, Renneboog 
  2007; Weir 
  2005b). Firms have also been shown to delist for pragmatic 
reasons, e.g., low trading volumes in US markets, the ability of home markets to meet capital their 
capital needs, and increased cost and complexity of US market regulations such as the Sarbanes

Oxley Act (Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Chaplinsky and Ramchand, 2012; Bharath and Dittmar, 2010; 
Pour and Laser, 2013). 
 
2 (	
	1	

			

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Firms, perhaps, evaluate the net benefit of remaining listed in a dynamic context where both firm

level and country
level (both home and foreign) factors change over time, when deciding whether to 
remain listed. Within this context, the allegations of accounting fraud involving Chinese firms listed 
on US markets may have increased investors’ uncertainty over the true value of Chinese public firms, 
particularly, for firms with high levels of “difficult
to
value” intangible assets. Chinese firms, within 
this context, also face heightened uncertainty due to increased scrutiny by analysts who may provide 
wrong forecasts (Anagnostopoulou, 2008). These information asymmetries and uncertainties reduce 
investors’ willingness to fund investments, and consequently reducing firms’ access to new equity 
and/or increasing their underlying cost of capital. This paper argues that this tension, partly, offsets the 
expected benefits of remaining listed on US markets. 
Empirical evidence on the role of intangible assets on corporate delisting decisions is rare in the 
US
 and UK
focused literature, and virtually non
existent for emerging economies. The few studies 
that include R&D or intangibles in their analysis have them as control variables to proxy for 
information asymmetry, and report mixed results. For example, Pour and Laser (2013) provide weak 
evidence for a positive association between intangible assets and firms’ delisting decisions, but 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Marosi and Massoud (2007) find that the estimated coefficients for 
intangible asset ratios are insignificant, implying that information asymmetry is not a factor in the 
delisting decision. 
The current article contributes to this literature by hypothesising that, within the context of 
heightened uncertainty in US stock markets over Chinese public firms following recent series of 
reports of accounting fraud, the levels of intangible investments played a crucial role in Chinese firms’ 
decision to delist from the US stock exchanges. This is primarily because firms’ intangible 
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investments, within this context, impede their ability to issue new equity at a reasonable cost, thereby, 
shaping their overall costs and net benefits of remaining listed. By their very nature, intangible 
investments attract greater analyst coverage (Barth 
 , 2001) and are more susceptible to analyst 
forecast errors (Amir 
  , 2003), thereby, having serious consequences on firm valuations 
(Anagnostopoulou, 2008). Further, accounting rules for valuing goodwill and charging impairment 
losses (e.g. IFRS 3) create room for managerial discretion/manipulations of financial statements 
(Watts, 2003; Bepari and Mollick, 2017), which further dampen investor confidence in firms’ 
valuations of their intangible assets (Sun and Zhang, 2017). Therefore, in periods of general market 
uncertainty, public firms with higher investments in intangibles may incur greater costs of remaining 
listed, and are (thus) more likely to delist. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is formulated as follows:  
 /	
	
 	 	
	1 
  
 
 $
 
 
	
	 
 
2 2/	
	14
		56	

	

	
			
The nexus between the decision to delist and intangible investments is likely to be accentuated by 
the availability or otherwise of alternative sources of financing for firms. For listed firms with high 
intangibles but without the ability to fund their intangible investments internally or from external debt, 
their net benefits for remaining listed may be relatively higher, making them less likely to delist. On 
the contrary, when firms have suitable and less costly means of financing (e.g., accumulated reserves, 
prior equity issues, or bank loans), their net benefit of remaining listed is reduced, making them more 
likely to delist from stock markets, in periods of high market uncertainty. Since large, mature, and 
established firms tend to be able to access alternative funding sources (Muller and Zimmermann, 
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2008; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), it is expected that such firms will have a greater likelihood to 
delist when they have high levels of intangible assets. Therefore, the second hypothesis is proposed 
for testing: 
  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To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, a sample of all privatisation announcements during 2010 and 2016 
by Chinese firms listed on major US stock exchanges is collected, regardless of whether the 
privatisation process completed successfully. This was to reflect the objective of investigating the role 
of intangible investments on firms’ 	 
 
. It is considered that public privatisation 
announcements by firms are preceded by an earlier decision to delist. However, for simplicity, the 
paper refers to these firms making privatisation announcements as delisting firms.  
The data on Chinese firms delisting from US stock exchanges (e.g. firms’ names and dates of 
delisting announcement) are hand
collected from three prominent Chinese financial web
based 
platforms (, ;5	 and 			).7 All the other data for the study including the IPO dates 
and financial data are collected from the ,	 		 !
1 < The search identified 94 US

listed Chinese companies that had publicly announced their decision to delist during 2010
2016. This 
averages 13 transactions per year. Notably, Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2012) report an average 
annual delisting of 16 	 firms from US markets between 1962 and 2006, suggesting 
disproportionately higher delisting announcements by Chinese firms from US exchanges in recent 
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years relative to other foreign firms.  
Due to data constraints, three firms drop out of the sample, leaving a final sample of 91 Chinese 
firms delisting from four major US stock exchanges9 over the sample period. Table 1 presents the 
distribution of the sample by stock exchange and industry of the delisting firms. Over half of the 
sample (58%) exits the NASDAQ, with another 32% exiting the NYSE. The remaining 10% of the 
sample predominantly delists from other OTC markets. Noticeably, almost half (44%) of the sample is 
from the Information Technology industry which generally tends to be R&D
intensive. This provides 
some early anecdotal evidence of a possible link between intangibles and corporate delisting 
transactions. 
*+,-.
.45,
(
6,-,0

Table 2 displays the sample distribution by year of delisting announcement, year of listing (i.e. 
IPO), as well as, by the number of trading years firms had been on the stock exchange before 
delisting. As can be seen, the highest number of delisting announcements (30) was observed in 2015, 
coinciding with the year immediately following the accounting fraud allegation by Citron Research 
against Evergrande. Similarly, the second and third highest numbers of delisting announcements were 
observed within the two
year period (2011
2012) after Muddy Waters reported of fraudulent 
accounting in Orient Paper Inc. in 2010. These statistics, perhaps, provide some basis for public 
opinion that the recent wave of delisting of Chinese firms from US exchanges is a response to the 
accounting fraud allegations. 
IPO information suggests that the sample firms were listed on US stock exchanges between 2000 
and 2014, with the highest listing in any single year (27 firms) observed in 2007. Only 17 firms (19%) 
listed on US markets after 2010 (post
ONP fraud allegations) and none listed after 2014 (post
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Evergrande fraud allegations). Again, these statistics suggest that the accounting fraud allegations 
might have reduced the appetite of Chinese firms for US stock markets. Finally, at the time of 
delisting, majority of sample (almost 70%) had traded on the US markets for five years or less, 
suggesting that most firms may lack sufficient experience of operating in US exchanges.  
*+,-.
.45,
1
6,-,0
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The main empirical approach of the paper is a probit regression model predicting the probability 
of a firm delisting from the st ck exchange conditional on its intangible investments and a set of 
control variables. The dependent variable is equal to one for voluntary delisted firms and zero for 
control firms. Similar to previous studies (e.g. Pour and Laser, 2013), each Chinese delisted firm 
(delist sample) is matched with a Chinese firm that remained listed (control sample) on US markets 
based on industry, size, and IPO date. The final empirical analysis is based on a 182 observations (i.e. 
91 delisting firms x 91 non
delisting controls).  
The baseline probit model for the empirical analysis is specified below in Eq. (1): 







 =/*!
. +++== ∑
=
−− βββ
1
1
1121)1(                                   Eq. (1) 
where: 
. refers to the probability of firm  delisting from the US stock exchange, the s represent the 
intercept ( ), the coefficient for intangible assets ratio (IAR) ( ), and for the control variables (
). The is the random error term assumed to be serially uncorrelated and homoscedastic. 1−
/*
represents a one
period lagged value of the firm’s intangible investments, the primary variable of 
interest, which is predicted to be positively related to corporate delisting decision (;)). Finally, 1−
=
in Eq. (1) represents one of the following lagged  control variables that may affect firms’ decision to 
β
1β 2β β


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delist. The control variables are lagged to minimize reverse causality problems (endogeneity).  
The control variables are defined in Table 3. First, the number of listing years (i.e. the period 
between the IPO date and the delisting date) is included to control for two effects; the experience 
effect and the stability/financing effect. Firms that have been on the market for long may be more 
experienced in dealing with crisis and may thus be less likely to panic and exit the market in 
challenging times. Alternatively, these firms may represent mature, established firms with more 
analysts’ coverage and alternative funding sources (Merton, 1987; Baker 
   2002; Lang 
   
2003), and may therefore have a higher likelihood to delist should they consider the cost of remaining 
listed to be too high. The financing effect is further controlled for by including additional variables 
that may capture varying aspects of firms’ ability to source alternative capital since obtaining 
financing is one of the primary reasons why firms become public (Reese and Weisbach, 2002). These 
variables include: (1) return on equity, proxying for current profitability, which may contribute to 
retained earnings for internal financing; (2) financial leverage to proxy for borrowing ability; (3) 
seasoned equity offerings as a proxy for firms’ attractiveness to investors and possible presence of 
reserves from prior equity issues; and (4) log of total assets as a proxy for the size of firms’ internal 
capital market.10 
*+,-.
.45,
2
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Another set of controls included in the regression aims to account for firms’ growth prospects. 
Firms with higher growth prospects may need more funds to finance their growth opportunities and 
may thus be less willing to delist (Bancel and Mittoo, 2008; Aslan and Kumar, 2011; Chaplinsky and 
Ramchand, 2012). This effect is captured by including the 3
year average operating profit growth rate, 
capital expenditure intensity, net assets per share, and market
to
book ratio. The market
to
book ratio 
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may also proxy for misvaluation (i.e. over
 or under
valuation) of the firm resulting from information 
asymmetry. 
Further, since privatisation may serve as a tool for aligning managerial interests with those of 
shareholders in public firms that potentially suffer from agency problems (Jensen, 1986; Elmagrhi 

  2017), the agency effect on delisting is controlled for by including an indicator variable for CEO 
duality (i.e. CEOs doubling up as the Board Chair) and a free cash flow variable. The free
cash flow 
variable may also pick up some alternative financing effect. Lastly, year fixed
effect is controlled for 
by including dummies for the delisting years to account for macroeconomic factors that may influence 
corporate delisting transactions.  
The baseline probit regression model in Eq. (1) is modified when testing ;( and when 
conducting additional robustness checks. For example, the model for testing ;( contains an additional 
interaction term between IAR and a financing variable, as shown in Eq. (2):                           
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

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Panel A of Table 4 summarises the descriptive statistics for the study’s variables for the full 
sample and also separately for the delist and control samples. As displayed in the Table, the firms in 
the delist sample have a substantially higher investments in intangible assets compared with their 
counterparts. Specifically, the intangible assets ratio is 11% for the delist sample relative to 7.9% for 
the control sample, with the difference of 3.1% being statistically significant at the 10% level. This 
again provides early evidence in support of ;), in that, intangible investments seem to be positively 
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associated with firms’ delisting decisions.  
Although the differences between the delist and control sample for the other variables were not 
statistically significant, firms that delisted from the stock exchanges generally had lower listing years, 
market
to
book ratio, profitability growth rate, free cash flow, net assets per share, and capital 
expenditure intensity. These statistics suggest that delisting firms may be more naïve (inexperienced 
in stock market dealings), undervalued, with limited growth prospects. However, delisting firms 
appear to have better prospects of obtaining alternative financing by being larger and more attractive 
to investors (due to recent success in seasoned equity offerings), as well as having greater current 
profitability and leverage levels. These patterns are largely in line with ;(. 
*+,-.
.45,
3
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In Panel B of Table 4, the correlation matrix for the variables is presented, and observably, there 
is a statistically significant positive association between intangibles and delisting transactions. There 
also seem to be a positive (negative) association between corporate delisting activities and CEO 
duality, profitability, leverage, firm size, and seasoned equity offerings (listing years, market
to
book 
ratio, profitability growth, free
cash flow, net assets per share, and capital expenditure), albeit not 
statistically significant. Panel B of the table also shows low levels of correlation among the 
explanatory variables (less than 0.5 coefficients), suggesting that multicolinearity may not pose any 
serious limitations on the multivariate regression analysis in the next section.         
 
5.2
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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
Table 5 presents the results for the probit regressions for the effect of intangibles on corporate 
delisting decisions. The marginal effects (reported in the Table), relate to the partial effect of each 
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explanatory variable on the probability of delisting, and help to directly interpret the coefficients as 
probabilities (see Agyei
Boapeah, 2017; Pour and Lasfer, 2013). In Model 1, the intangible asset ratio 
(IAR) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level (coefficient=0.029; 4=0.002), 
suggesting that Chinese firms with high levels of intangible investments were more likely to delist 
from the US stock exchanges during the sample period. The marginal effect of the intangibles (IAR) is 
0.011, implying that a unit increase in intangible investment increases the probability of delisting by 
1.1%, on average. With the average sample firm having 9.5% of assets in intangibles, this result 
suggests a delisting probability of 11% (i.e. 0.011?9.5) for a firm undertaking average levels of 
investments in intangible assets. 
The positive relationship betwee  intangibles and the delisting decision is consistent with 
theoretical predictions. That is, increased levels of intangible investments appear to be associated with 
increased cost of remaining listed on stock exchanges, which emanates from an increased risk of 
financial statement manipulations by managers (Watts, 2003), greater analyst coverage (Barth 
  
2001) as well as higher analysts’ forecast errors (Amir 
  , 2003), and higher information 
asymmetry (Muller and Zimmermann, 2009; Czarnitzki and Hottenrott, 2011), leading to the 
undervaluation/mispricing of such firms (Anagnostopoulou, 2008) and potential losses to their 
shareholders (Weir 
  2005b). Consequently, these factors together increase (reduce) the costs (net 
benefits) of staying listed on the exchange for high
intangible firms, causing them to delist from the 
stock exchange.  
Overall, the broad implications of the findings are consistent with the generic cost
benefit 
theoretic framework for understanding public
to
private transactions (see Marosi and Massoud, 2007; 
Bharath and Dittmar, 2010). For example, Bharath and Dittmar (2010) posit that since the decision to 
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go public is a trade
off between the costs and benefits of listing, the delisting decision is also likely to 
be taken when the costs of listing exceed the benefits.  
*+,-.
.45,
7
6,-,0        
In the next three Models of Table 5, tests for robustness of the results are conducted by measuring 
the primary explanatory variable, intangible investments, using different indicator variables. First, in 
Model 2, high
intangible firms are defined to include a dummy for firms with above
median 
intangibles. Similarly, in Models 3 and 4, the definition of high
intangible firms is restricted to 
include only firms in the top 40% and 25% brackets for intangible investments, respectively. The 
results, reported in Table 5, confirm the strong positive impact of intangibles on the ultimate delisting 
decisions of firms. Specifically, the probability of delisting from stock exchanges increases by 
between 19
22% if firms are within the top tier for intangible investments. Collectively, these results 
offer empirical support for ;), as well as provide further support to the findings of previous studies 
(e.g. Marosi and Massoud, 2007; Chaplinskya and Ramchand, 2012; Pour and Laser, 2013), which 
suggest that firms consider the costs and net benefits of listing in deciding whether to remain or delist 
from stock markets. Pour and Laser (2013) provide evidence to suggest that firms delist voluntarily 
from the London Stock Exchange when they fail to benefit from listing by not raising sufficient equity 
capital to rebalance their capital structure. In the US, Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Chaplinskya 
and Ramchand (2012) find that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) and the associated compliance costs 
are major determinants of corporate delisting decision by increasing the listing costs of public firms. 
In comparison, the findings of the present paper imply that listing costs (benefits) are higher (lower) 
for firms with higher investments in intangible assets.  
In terms of the control variables, firms that have been listed for more years and those with higher 
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growth prospects (i.e., market
to
book value, operating profit growth, net assets per share) seem to 
have a significantly reduced probability of delisting. Also, current profitability (measured as return on 
equity) appears to consistently have a positive and significant impact on the decision to delist. These 
results are generally in line with prior studies such as Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Pour and Lasfer 
(2013). 
Turning attention to ;(, there is evidence that the presence of alternative sources of financing 
intangible projects may influence the intangibles
delisting nexus, as shown in Table 6. As noted in 
section 4 [in specifying Eq. (2)], the IAR is interacted with each of the explanatory variables which 
could represent an alternative source of financing, namely; listing years, return on equity, free cash 
flow, leverage, firm size, and seasoned equity offerings. The results are reported in Models 1
6 of 
Table 6. First, the number of years for which a firm has been listed (listing years) is negative and 
statistically significant at 99% confidence level, implying that Chinese firms with more experience of 
the stock exchange dealings are more likely to remain listed. More importantly, the coefficient of the 
interaction term (IAR*Listing years) is positive and statistically significant at 5% level, suggesting 
that even the experienced firms decide to delist when they have high intangibles. To the extent that 
these experienced firms with greater listing history, analyst coverage, and market exposure are more 
attractive to investors and could easily obtain capital elsewhere (see Agyei
Boapeah, 2015), then these 
results provide empirical support for ;(. Agyei
Boapeah (2015) finds UK acquiring firms with 
significant experience in foreign markets to reap some financing advantages over their inexperienced 
counterparts.  
However, in Models 2
4, the interaction terms [(IAR*Return on Equity); (IAR*Free cash flow); 
and (IAR*Financial leverage)] though positive, lack statistical significance at conventional levels, and 
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therefore inconsistent with ;(. It is, however, possible that the current levels of profitability and free 
cash flow are not sufficient to fund intangible investments, thus, making firms reluctant to delist. 
Similarly, it may be that bondholders are less willing to fund intangible investments because of their 
lack of collateral value. Consequently, borrowing may not really be an alternative source of financing 
intangible assets. Moreover, Czarnitzki and Hottenrott (2011) show that R&D projects are more likely 
to be funded from internal capital markets that are associated with large, diversified firms (Agyei

Boapeah, 2017). Consistent with this conjecture and ;(, the results in Model 5 show that high

intangible firms are more likely to delist from stock exchanges when they are large and likely to have 
a sizeable pool of internal capital market to finance their intangible investments internally. Further, the 
individual effect of intangibles (without internal capital market) and firm size (without high intangible 
investments) on delisting decision are statistically negative, suggesting that even the high
intangible 
firms stay listed if they may not be able to fund their intangible investments from their internal capital 
markets. These findings offer further support for ;(. 
Finally, the influence of financing from a prior equity issue on the intangibles
delisting nexus is 
considered. Reese and Weisbach (2002) find that firms raise a substantial amount of equity following 
cross
listings in the US, which helps them to build up a pool of reserves to fund future projects. 
Accordingly, ;( predicts that prior equity issues should reduce the net benefits of remaining listed, 
and thus increase the likelihood for such firms to delist when they carry high intangible assets. The 
results in Model 6 support this conjecture, with a positive and significant positive coefficient for the 
interaction term (IAR*Seasoned equity offerings) (coefficient=0.071; 4=0.005). This implies 
that when firms are likely to have a pool of equity capital from past equity issues, they are more likely 
to delist from stock markets when they have high levels of current intangible investments.  
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Taken together, the results in Table 6 generally support the predictions of the proposed theoretical 
framework for this study which incorporates uncertainties in markets and valuation difficulties 
associated with intangible assets with the generic cost
benefit theoretic framework of studies such as 
Bharath and Dittmar (2010) and Chaplinskya and Ramchand (2012). That is, the information 
asymmetry associated with intangible assets increases (reduces) the costs (net benefits) of remaining 
listed for firms with high levels of intangibles. Thus, such firms tend to delist from the stock markets 
to protect their shareholders from losses, especially when they have alternative and potentially less 
costly ways of financing their intangibles.                              
 
8) 
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Unlike current studies on the motives behind firms’ delisting decisions, which tend to focus 
largely on firms in developed economies and often ignoring the role of intangible assets, this study 
examines the predictive effect of intangible investments on corporate delisting decisions. In addition, 
it seeks to ascertain whether alternative sources of financing (other than raising new equity from the 
stock exchange) have a moderating effect on the intangibles
delisting nexus. A peculiar feature of the 
paper is that it is conducted within the context of Chinese firms listed on US markets and focused on 
delisting announcements made during the recent period of 2010
2016. This period is characterised by 
heightened uncertainty in US stock markets over Chinese public firms due to a series of accounting 
fraud allegations made against Chinese public firms by US analysts. Given that intangible assets 
attract more analyst coverage/attention, and are associated with greater analyst forecast errors, as well 
as present managers with opportunities to manipulate financial statements, US
listed Chinese firms 
with large amounts of intangibles risk having their shares mispriced/undervalued and incurring 
Page 22 of 36International Journal of Accounting and Information Management
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
International Journal of A
ccounting and Inform
ation M
anagem
ent
20 
 
significant losses. All else equal, such firms acting reasonably should have a greater incentive to delist 
from the stock market. 
Based on probit regression analysis controlling for a number of variables and year fixed
effects, 
and insights drawn from the asymmetric information and cost
benefit theories of listing, the results 
are summarized as follows. Firstly, investment in intangible assets is a strong predictor of corporate 
delisting decisions for emerging market firms cross
listing on stock exchanges in advanced countries. 
This implies that emerging market firms with large intangibles do face additional listing costs on 
advanced markets when there is greater market uncertainty relating to accounting fraud. Secondly, the 
finding indicates that the relationship between intangibles and the likelihood for emerging market 
firms to exit advanced stock markets is contingent on the availability of alternative funding sources, 
particularly internal funding and prior equity issues. More specifically, the results show that the 
positive impact of intangibles on firms’ probability to delist is higher for larger firms with greater 
internal capital market, more listing years, and more reserves built up from prior seasoned equity 
issues. Thus, without surplus internal funds, high
intangibles emerging market firms cross
listing on 
advanced markets may be forced to accept significant shareholder losses in periods of greater market 
uncertainty. The interpretation and implications of our results are largely consistent with expectations 
of the theoretical framework, which is based on insights from the asymmetric information, and cost

benefit theories of listing. 
We make new contributions to the existing literature. Specifically, we contribute to the debate on 
the motivations behind the recent wave of delisting by Chinese firms from US markets by providing 
evidence to suggest that the reportage of US analysts on accounting fraud involving Chinese public 
firms may have increased the cost of remaining listed for firms with high investments in intangible 
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assets. An implication of the finding is that in periods of high market uncertainty, firms with a 
significant investment in intangible assets risks destroying shareholders’ wealth if they remain listed 
on the stock exchange. Given the importance of intangible investments in promoting innovation and 
economic growth, this finding should be worrisome to policy makers. Accordingly, policy makers and 
standard setters must continue to work to improve the accounting regulations of intangible assets and 
to promote the adoption of global accounting standard across both emerging and advanced economies. 
Another key finding of the study is that the presence of alternative sources of funding helps to 
mitigate the listing costs in turbulent times. An important implication flowing from this finding is that 
public firms planning huge investments in intangibles should build up a reserve of internal funds as a 
hedge against any increased future costs of remaining listed should the market become more 
turbulent. Not having any funding reserves appears to leave public firms with no option but to remain 
on the stock exchange and reluctantly accept the underpricing of their shares. Therefore, market 
participants must keep an eye on the internal reserves of those public firms with huge investments in 
intangibles. 
Finally, inasmuch this paper makes important extensions to the literature, it is based on a limited 
sample and the specific context of Chinese firms listed on US markets during a period of heightened 
uncertainty due to accounting fraud allegations. Therefore, generalising the results outside this context 
should be done cautiously. Further studies could offer additional insights by utilizing a larger sample 
that considers several cases of accounting fraud allegations across countries over time for an analysis 
that will permit generalisation to a larger extent. In addition, the focus of this paper did not extend to 
the valuation implications of the delisting firms, making it unclear whether the market considers 
delisting by high
intangible firms to be the “best” (value
enhancing) decision. This could again serve 
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as a potential avenue of future research, which could utilise event
study methodologies to examine 
this issue.   
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Firm size @((A 0.0179 
0.0467 0.2480 ?)(DD2
 
0.1085 
0.0402 ?)17D(
 ?)2322
 ?)1D<3
 ?)12D7
 1.0000   
Capex (%)
@(1A 
0.0665 0.0038 
0.0209 0.0127 0.0243 
0.0963 
0.0280 >?)18=(
 
0.0082 0.0571 
0.0511 1.0000 
Seasoned equity offerings @(2A 0.0395 0.0116 0.1067 0.0061 0.0538 0.0965 
0.0380 
0.0791 
0.0042 0.1075 ?)(782
 
0.0609 
Variables are defined in Table 4. In Panel A, ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. In Panel B, figures in bold denote statistical significance at conventional levels (i.e. 10% or 
below). 
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
	


	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		
@(A
 
		
 @1A
 
		
 @2A
 
		
 @3A
 
		

                
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) 0.0286*** 0.011 
        (0.002) 
Above
median IAR firm dummy 
  
0.5685*** 0.224 
      (0.006) 
Top 40% IAR firm dummy 
    
0.5018** 0.198 
    (0.018) 
Top 25% IAR firm dummy 
      
0.4955** 0.195 
  (0.040) 
Listing years 
0.0499* 
0.020 
0.0483* 
0.019 
0.0455 
0.018 
0.0468* 
0.019 
  (0.071) (0.093) (0.111) (0.097) 
Market
to
book value 
0.0488* 
0.019 
0.0500* 
0.020 
0.0451* 
0.018 
0.0426* 
0.017 
  (0.056) (0.055) (0.091) (0.098) 
CEO duality 0.2361 0.094 0.2062 0.082 0.1543 0.061 0.1888 0.075 
  (0.266) (0.318) (0.450) (0.365) 
Average operating profit growth 
0.0005* 0.000 
0.0005** 0.000 
0.0005** 0.000 
0.0005* 0.000 
  (0.054) (0.034) (0.040) (0.084) 
Return on equity 0.0080*** 0.003 0.0061** 0.002 0.0061** 0.002 0.0061** 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.023) (0.019) (0.014) 
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Free cash flow 
0.0051 
0.002 
0.0046 
0.002 
0.0060 
0.002 
0.0058 
0.002 
  (0.568) (0.607) (0.501) (0.507) 
Net assets per share 
0.0228* 
0.009 
0.0198 
0.008 
0.0211* 
0.008 
0.0198 
0.008 
  (0.088) (0.101) (0.083) (0.114) 
Financial leverage 0.0035 0.001 0.0038 0.002 0.0031 0.001 0.0028 0.001 
  (0.451) (0.416) (0.504) (0.546) 
Firm size 0.0402 0.016 0.0306 0.012 0.0378 0.015 0.0412 0.016 
  (0.630) (0.713) (0.644) (0.617) 
Capital expenditure intensity 
0.3765 
0.002 
0.4339 
0.002 
0.3591 
0.001 
0.3730 
0.001 
  (0.333) (0.262) (0.350) (0.326) 
Seasoned equity offerings 0.1212 0.048 0.1654 0.066 0.1057 0.042 0.1316 0.052 
  (0.609) (0.491) (0.657) (0.575) 
Year fixed
effect Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
   … … … … 
Constant 
0.4851 
 

0.5059 
 

0.4192 
 

0.3751 
   (0.593) (0.578) (0.640) (0.679) 
              
 
  
+)

	
 182   182   182   182   
->E	
 0.092   0.084   0.075   0.070   
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm publicly announced its decision to delist, otherwise zero. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are utilised in the 
probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
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.	
8

		


		

	

	
			 @(A
 @1A
 @2A
 @3A
 @7A
 @8A

  
     
  
Intangible asset ratio (IAR) 
0.0007 0.0304*** 0.0291*** 0.0131 
0.3408*** 0.0179* 
  (0.961) (0.002) (0.002) (0.369) (0.000) (0.080) 
IAR * Listing years 0.0059**   
  (0.014) 
    
  
IAR * Return on equity 0.0001   
  
 
(0.363) 
   
  
IAR * Free cash flow 0.0007   
  
  
(0.224) 
  
  
IAR * Financial leverage 0.0005   
  
   
(0.220) 
 
  
IAR * Firm size 0.0356***   
  
    
(0.000)   
IAR * Seasoned equity offerings 0.0711*** 
  
     
(0.005) 
Listing years 
0.1064*** 
0.0490* 
0.0504* 
0.0480* 
0.0535* 
0.0487* 
  (0.003) (0.078) (0.071) (0.086) (0.075) (0.082) 
Market
to
book value 
0.0559** 
0.0428 
0.0410 
0.0611** 
0.0377 
0.0443* 
  (0.034) (0.129) (0.136) (0.037) (0.197) (0.086) 
CEO duality 0.3002 0.2363 0.2177 0.2412 0.3157 0.2689 
  (0.163) (0.265) (0.308) (0.253) (0.152) (0.205) 
Average operating profit growth 
0.0006* 
0.0005* 
0.0005* 
0.0005** 
0.0006* 
0.0006** 
  (0.061) (0.058) (0.060) (0.047) (0.073) (0.031) 
Return on equity 0.0097*** 0.0058 0.0063* 0.0101*** 0.0068* 0.0076*** 
  (0.000) (0.159) (0.052) (0.001) (0.055) (0.002) 
Free cash flow 
0.0063 
0.0047 
0.0093 
0.0064 
0.0064 
0.0078 
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  (0.486) (0.599) (0.333) (0.475) (0.528) (0.380) 
Net assets per share 
0.0263* 
0.0230* 
0.0204* 
0.0220* 
0.0258* 
0.0204 
  (0.066) (0.087) (0.098) (0.090) (0.082) (0.116) 
Financial leverage 0.0048 0.0041 0.0036 0.0004 0.0046 0.0043 
  (0.302) (0.384) (0.438) (0.946) (0.360) (0.354) 
Firm size 0.0421 0.0330 0.0274 0.0398 
0.2231** 0.0359 
  (0.617) (0.695) (0.743) (0.630) (0.023) (0.668) 
Capital expenditure intensity 
0.4872 
0.3080 
0.3258 
0.4276 
0.3761 
0.4150 
  (0.218) (0.439) (0.404) (0.285) (0.339) (0.292) 
Seasoned equity offerings 0.1213 0.1032 0.0921 0.1434 0.0731 
0.3843 
  (0.618) (0.666) (0.700) (0.549) (0.771) (0.228) 
Year fixed
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
  … … … … … … 
Constant 
0.2055 
0.4475 
0.3691 
0.3570 2.0449* 
0.3478 
  (0.823) (0.622) (0.684) (0.694) (0.051) (0.705) 
  
     
  
+)

	
 182 182 182 182 182 182 
->E	
 0.112 0.094 0.096 0.097 0.163 0.117 
The dependent variable takes a value of one if a firm publicly announced its decision to delist, otherwise zero. All other variables are defined in Table 4. Robust standard errors are 
utilised in the probit regressions. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1A voluntary delisting is one that is initiated by a firm upon agreement with its shareholders (Pour and Lasfer, 2015). 
2Intangible assets are more difficult to value resulting in high information asymmetry between firms and investors (see Anagnostopoulou’s (2008)’s review). International 
Accounting Standard (IAS) 38 sets out the recognition and measuring criteria, as well as, the disclosure requirements for intangible assets, defined as identifiable non

monetary assets without physical form. Examples of intangible assets include computer software, licenses, trademarks, patents, copyrights, goodwill, research and 
development (R&D) expenditure, etc. 
3The few available Chinese studies are either theoretical in nature or based on single case study analysis, thus, lacking empirical analysis to provide persuasive evidence to 
support those theories/perspectives (e.g. Liu 
  2016; Zhang, 2012). 
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4The full report can be accessed via this link: http://www.muddywatersresearch.com/content/uploads/2010/06/ONP_Report_June2010.pdf 
5Orient Paper Inc. (ONP) forms part of our control sample for the empirical analysis. ONP listed on the New York Stock Exchange on 17th December 2009 and remained 
listed as at the time of our data collection.  
6Detailed report can be obtained from this link: http://www.mmt.gov.hk/eng/reports/Evergrande_Report.pdf 
7iMeigu (http://www.imeigu.com/), Hexun (http://www.hexun.com/), and Sina Finance (http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/usstock/). 
8The ,	 financial database is a leading source of economic and financial data on China and Chinese firms. It provides investment professionals with the data and insights 
they need to understand China's complex capital markets and economy. 
9These include the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), American Stock Exchange (AMEX), National Association of Securities Dealers Automatic Quotation System 
(NASDAQ), and other Over the Counter (OTC) markets. 
10Dropping firm size as a control variable from the regression model did not change the results and conclusions qualitatively. It was decided to include it to limit the 
possibility of omitted variable problems. More so, models including the firm size variable seemed to have higher explanatory power (as indicated by the Pseudo R
square 
statistic) compared with those without firm size. 
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